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O N December 16, 1952, the Civil Aeronautics Board promulgated a
proposed economic regulation which, if adopted, would impose
on the certificated air carriers compulsory financial responsibility re-
quirements with respect to the payment of certain tort liabilities.1 In
substance and practical effect the regulation would require the certifi-
cated air carriers to maintain insurance policies of a specified type, in
prescribed limits, and only with Board approved insurance companies.
This regulation, if enacted, will be a complete departure from any
of -the fields of regulation the Board has heretofore occupied with
respect to the certificated air carriers. Such action, moreover, would
subject the certificated air carriers to a form of regulation that has
not been imposed upon any other type of common carrier other than
motor carriers; and even in the case of motor carriers, such regulations
have been imposed only with express Congressional or legislative
sanction. Grave doubts exist as to whether the Board actually has the
legal authority to invade this highly important field of air carrier
management, and, even if it should be found to have such power, as
to whether the economic facts justify the exercise of such power.
I. THE LEGAL AUTHORITY
A. Scope of Board Authority to Issue Regulations
In compliance with the requirements of Section 4 (a) of the Ad-
ministrative Procedures Act (5 U. S. C. 1003), the Board has specified
Sections 205 (a), 401, 402 and 416 (a) of the Civil Aeronautics Act as
the basis for its authority to issue the proposed regulation. The rele-
vant portion of Section 205 (a) reads as follows:
"The Board is empowered to issue such . .. regulations, .
pursuant to and consistent with the provisions of this Act, as it
shall deem necessary. to carry out such provisions and to exercise
and perform its powers and duties under this Act."
This is a specific and limited grant of authority. Regulations issued
1 CAB Economic Regulation Draft Release No. 58, 17 Fed. Reg. 11700. The
scope of this regulation also includes non-certificated air carriers, but this article
is addressed only to the regulation as applied to the certificated air carriers.
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in accordance with this section must be "pursuant to and consistent
with the provisions of this Act." Section 205 (a) is not a general grant
of regulatory authority under which the Board may issue any regu-
lation, pertaining to the operation, management and general affairs
of air carriers under its jurisdiction, which it deems necessary and in
the public interest. The unambiguous language of Section 205 (a)
authorizes the Board to issue only such regulations as implement
those powers which Congress has expressly conferred upon the Board
by specific provisions in the Act.
Similarly, Section 416 (a) authorizes the Board to establish classes
of air carriers and to establish:
"... such just and reasonable rules, and regulations, pursuant
to and consistent with the provisions of this Title, to be observed
by each such class or group, as the Board finds necessary in the
public interest." (Italics added)
Here, again, the authority of the Board to issue rules and regula-
tions is expressly made subject to the condition that such- regulations
must be "pursuant to and consistent with" the provisions of Title IV
of the Act.
Even apart from the precise limitations in Sections 205 (a) and
416 (a) on the Board's power to issue regulations, the law on the sub-
ject of the authority of administrative agencies to issue regulations
establishes identical limitations. In Manhattan General Equipment
Co. v. Commissioner, 297 U. S. 129, 80 L. Ed. 528, the Supreme Court
said, at p. 531,
"The power of an administrative officer or board to administer a
federal statute and to prescribe rules and regulations to that end
is not the power to make law-for no such power can be delegated
by Congress-but the power to adopt regulations to carry into
effect the will of Congress as expressed by the statute."
In Peoples Bank v. Eccles, 161 F. 2d 636, the question arose as to
the validity of a Federal Reserve Board regulation applicable to bank
holding companies. The U. S. Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia, at pages 640-641, in holding the regulation unlawful, stated
as follows:
"Whether the Board of Governors has the power, in the effort to
implement its theory that the enlargement of bank holding com-
panies should be forbidden, to deny to Transamerica its right,
otherwise entirely legal, to purchase and own shares in the Peoples
Bank, depends on whether the Federal Reserve Act expressly or
impliedly confers such authority. In other words, the validity of
Condition No. 4 as a curb to the growth of a bank holding company
depends upon whether the Congress intended to authorize the Board
to arrest the extension of such companies. If such a legislative intent
does not appear, grave doubt arises as to the right of the Board to
form such an intent for itself. Furthermore, if a contrary intent on
the part of Congress be found, unquestionably the Board's assump-
tion of the power to check the expansion of bank holding companies
amounts to an invasion of the legislative field. All the Board's power
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springs from the statute. An administrative agency may have a wide
latitude within which to function, and may be authorized to pre-
scribe regulations which must be observed by those subject to its
Jurisdiction. But its regulations must fall within the limits of the
authorizing statute, and must be such as will carry into effect the
will of Congress. The broad discretion confided to the Board of
Governors continues only so long as it acts within its statutory
scope. When the Board reaches the border of the Federal Reserve
Act it must stop, for to go beyond would be to impinge on Con-
gressional prerogatives...
"The Act goes no further, with respect to limiting the activity of
a holding company, than to provide that one which owns a majority
of the shares of a member bank may not vote such shares without
first obtaining a permit from the Board of Governors . . . This
limited statutory restrictions upon bank holding companies, which
contrasts strikingly with the broad restraint imposed by the Board
in the present case, has added significance when considered in the
light of certain legislative history of the Federal Reserve Act. From
that history it is learned that the Congress, quite deliberately and
because of what it considered an abuse of a power which it thereto-
fore granted to the Board in broad general terms, provided that the
Board of Governors may only impose such conditions upon a bank's
admission to the System as are within and pursuant to the legisla-
tive intent in adopting the Act."' 2
The very recent decision of the Supreme Court in American Truck-
ing Assoc., Inc. et al v. I.C.C., U. S. Sup. Ct. No. 26, Oct. Term 1952,
decided January 12, 1953, 21 L.W. 4096, confirms the foregoing prin-
ciples relating to the scope of an administrative agency's power to
issue regulations. In that case the validity of an I.C.C. regulation
applicable to truck leasing was in question. The regulation was issued
by the I.C.C. after long investigation of the problem, extended hear-
ings, and detailed findings of fact. The motor carriers, -in opposing
the regulation, argued that the I.C.C. exceeded its authority in issuing
the regulation because there was no express provision in the Act
applicable to the subject of truck leasing. The Supreme Court, how-
ever, found that such power could be directly implied from various
specific provisions of the Act, saying (21 L.W. 4099):
"Moreover, we must reject at the outset any conclusion that the
rules as a whole represent an attempt by the Commission to expand
its power arbitrarily; there is clear and adequate evidence of evils
attendant on trip leasing. The purpose of the rules is to protect
2 See also: Miller v. U. S., 294 U. S. 435, 79 L. Ed. 977, (regulations pro-
mulgated by the Veterans Administration); U. S. v. George, 228 U. S. 14, 57 L.
Ed. 712, a regulation by the Commissioner of the General Land Office; Morrill v.
Jones, 106 U. S. 466, 27 L. Ed. 267, a customs regulation by the Secretary of the
Treasury; U. S. v. United Verde Copper Co., 196 U. S. 207, 49 L. Ed. 449, a
regulation issued by the Secretary of the Interior; Rodney Milling Co. V. U. S.,
75 Fed. Supp. 707, U. S. v. 200 Barrels of Whiskey, 95 U. S. 571, 24 L. Ed. 491,
and Lynch v. Tilden Produce Co., 265 U. S. 315, 68 L. Ed. 1034 (regulations of
the Bureau of Internal Revenue); Campbell v. Galeno Chemical Co., 281 U. S.
599, 74 L. Ed. 1063 (rules of the Commissioner- of Prohibition); Osborne v.
United States, 145 F. 2d 892 (regulations of the Secretary of Agriculture); and
Steam v. United States, 87 F. Supp. 596 (regulations of the Interstate Commerce
Commission).
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the industry from practices detrimental to the maintenance of
sound transportation services consistent with the regulatory system.
Sections 216 (b) and 218 (a) of the Act, for instance, require the
filing of a just and reasonable rate schedule by each common car-
rier, and the violation of these rates and the demoralizati on of
rate structures generally are a probable concomitant of current
leasing practices. Section 204 (a) (2) requires the Commission to
impose rules relating to safety of operation for vehicles and drivers.
These are likewise threatened by the unrestricted use of nonowned
equipment by the common carriers. And the requirements of con-
tinuous service in § 204 (a) (1), of observance of authorized routes
and termini under §§ 208 (a) and 209 (b), and the prohibitions of
rebates, §§ 216 (d), 217 (b), 218 (a) and 222 (c), also may be ignored
through the very practices here proscribed. So the rules in ques-
tion are aimed at conditions which may directly frustrate the success
of the regulation undertaken by Congress."
Thus, the regulation proposed by the Board is invalid unless the
Board has express or implied power under the Act to regulate air
carrier financial responsibility for payment of tort judgments, or unless
such authority is essential to carry out an express power.
B. Express Authority Under the Civil Aeronautics Act
The word "insurance" does not appear anywhere in the Act, nor
is there any reference in the Act to the liability or responsibility of an
air carrier to pay damages on account of liability incurred as a result
of death of passengers or other persons, or of property damage, or
for any other reason. The only appearance of the word "liability" in
the Act is in Section 504 (an amendment added in 1948) under which
Congress specifically exempted lessors and owners of security interests
in aircraft from liability for injuries to or death, of persons, or damage
to or loss of property, on the surface of earth, caused by such aircraft,
when not in the actual possession or control of such lessor or security
owner.
C. Implied Authority Under the Civil Aeronautics Act
It may be contended that the Board's power to regulate the method
by which air carriers shall meet their financial obligations in connec-
tion with tort liability arises, not expressly or by implication from any
particular provision of the Act, but impliedly from the entire content
of Part IV of the Act. Such a contention not only is subject. to grave
doubt on constitutional law grounds (hereinafter discussed), but
examination of Sections 401 and 402 of the Act, consideration of the
nature of the regulatory scheme established by the Act, analysis of the
structure of the Act, review of the history of air carrier financial
responsibility legislation, and the intent of Public Law 15 of the 79th
Congress, all completely dispel any notion that Congress may have
intended to confer such authority upon the Board by implication.
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(1) Authority to Attach Conditions to a Certificate
The Board cites Sections 401 and 402 as the basis for implied
authority for the proposed regulation. Section 401 (f) authorizes the
Board to "attach to the exercise of the privileges granted by the certi-
ficate, or amendment thereto, such reasonable terms, conditions, and
limitations as the public interest may require." Section 401 (h) author-
izes the Board to "alter, amend, modify, or suspend any such certificate,
in whole or in part, if the public convenience and necessity so require."
Sections 402 (f) and 402 (g) grant similar powers to the Board with
respect to foreign air carrier permits. However, these provisions give
the Board no power to regulate the methods by which carriers secure
funds to pay tort judgments, The Board's power to attach conditions
to a certificate or permit is broad, but it is not Unlimited. The condi-
tions must be directly related to the exercise of the privilege granted
by the certificate.
The Supreme Court, on numerous occasions, has held that an
administrative agency may not use a power to impose conditions as a
basis for expanding its substantive powers into new fields. Thus, in
Interstate Commerce Commission v. Cincinnati, N.O. K T.P.R. Co.,
167 U. S. 479, 42 L. Ed. 243, a case decided prior to the time the I.C.C.
had express power to fix rates, the Supreme Court held that the I.C.C.
could not use its express power to determine the reasonableness of rates
as the basis for imposing conditions which would, in' effect, amount
to the prescribing of rates by the I.C.C. In U. S. v. Pennsylvania R. Co.,
242 U. S. 208, 61 L. Ed. 251, the I.C.C. was prevented from requiring a
railroad to supply tank cars to a shipper, notwithstanding the express
duty of carriers under the Act to furnish transportation upon reason-
able request therefor and the express authority of the Commission to
execute and enforce the provisions of the Act. The Supreme Court
said, at page 61 L. Ed. 261: "A power so extraordinary and so vital,
reached by construction, could not justly rest upon any less foundation
than that of direct expression or necessary implication, and we find
neither of these in the statute." In Waite v. Macy, 246 U. S. 606, 62 L.
Ed. 892, the Supreme Court held that the Treasury Department's Tea
Board had in fact usurped power not granted to it by the Tea Inspection
Act by imposing as a condition of exclusion the presence of harmless
coloring matter in tea, when the Act permitted it to exclude tea only
if inferior to the established standards of purity, quality, and fitness for
human consumption. In U. S. v. Chi., M., St. P. R.R. Co., 282 U. S.
311, 75 L. Ed. 359, a condition imposed by the I.C.C., requiring a
particular financial settlement to be made by a railroad as a prerequisite
to I.C.C. approval of a security issue, was held by the Supreme Court
to exceed the express or implied power granted to the I.C.C. under its
statutory duty to approve or disapprove securities to be issued by
railroads.
The Board's power to attach terms and conditions to a certificate,
under Section 401 (f) of the Act, is therefore necessarily limited to
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matters germane to the exercise of the privilege granted by the certi-
ficate. That privilege is the right to operate aircraft in common carrier
service between designated points and over specified routes. The condi-
tions which the Board may attach to a certificate must be directly
related to the providing of such service. The Board presumably has
recognized this limitation in the past, because the conditions so imposed
have related specifically to the manner of performing the authorized
service, such as non-stop limitations, traffic limitations, airport limita-
tions, and similar operating conditions.3 Indeed, the very language of
Section 401 (f) , in describing certain types of conditions the Board
may not impose, likewise refers exclusively to operating matters.
The manner in which an air carrier may derive the necessary funds
to pay a judgment based on a tort claim arising out of an aircraft ac-
cident is a subject entirely apart from that of physically operating
aircraft in common carrier air service. If the Board could, by a condi-
tion in the certificate, require the air carrier to provide for the payment
of such debts in a particular manner, it also presumably could impose
a condition requiring the air carriers to pay its bills for gasoline in a
specified way, or a condition requiring the air carrier to obtain its
financing and to issue its securities in a prescribed fashion. In fact, if
the Board's authority to impose conditions may relate to anything the
Board deems to be in the public interest, as the Board contends at
Page 2 of its Draft Preamble, and is not limited to matters germane to
the exercise of the specific privilege granted by the certificate, then
all the other powers expressly granted to the Board with regard to air
carrier regulation are mere surplusage. All such powers could be derived
simply by imposing conditions in the certificate. Obviously, such broad
power was never intended by Congress to be vested in the Board by the
inconspicuous provision in Section 401 (f) authorizing the Board to
attach reasonable conditions to the exercise of the privilege granted
by the certificate.
(2) Air Carrier Regulation Generally
Under the doctrine of American Trucking Associations, Inc., et al,
v. I.C.C., supra, if the Board were to establish that its power to regulate
the air carriers under the Civil Aeronautics Act is jeopardized by the
absence of an obligation imposed upon the air carriers to provide for
the payment of their tort liabilities in a particular manner, then a
basis for implied authority to issue the proposed regulation presumably
might be found. No such contention, however, is made by the Board;
and the fifteen-year history of effective air carrier regulation under the
Act would make such a contention absurd on its face. Rather, the entire
basis advanced by the Board for its proposed action is to the effect
that Congress has overlooked a field of legislation in which the Board
feels that Congress should have acted; and because Congress did not
act in such field, the Board is taking it upon itself so to act.
3 See the Board's Economic Regulations Parts 202 and 203.
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Such a usurpation of legislative authority in the field of common
carrier financial responsibility legislation is not without precedent.
Financial responsibility regulations applicable to common carrier motor
vehicles are presently in force in many states; but in every state where
such a regulation now exists, it has been put into effect by the appropri-
ate state regulatory agency pursuant to a specific statutory authorization.
However, in two instances state regulatory agencies attempted to adopt
such financial responsibility regulations under general statutes grant-
ing such agencies authority to regulate common carriers, but without
specific legislative authority to deal with the subject of financial
responsibility, and in both instances such action was held to be
unlawful.
In West et al v. Sun Cab Company, Inc., 160 Md. 476, 154 At. 100
the Public S ervice Commission of Maryland required the Sun Cab
Company, which operated about two-hundred taxicabs in Baltimore,
"to take out and carry public liability insurance in a responsible insur-
ance company or companies and in a form satisfactory to the Com-
mission, and in the amount of $10,000 for any one person and $20,000
for any one accident . . ." In lieu of this requirement, the company was
authorized to maintain an indemnity reserve fund of not less than
$100,000. The taxicab company obtained an injunction on the ground
that the Commission had no authority to impose such a condition or
regulation. On appeal, the Court of Appeals of Maryland sustained
the injunction, saying:
"... There is only one question involved, and that is the power
of the commission to require taxicab owners to take out indemnity
insurance as a prerequisite to a permit to operate cabs in this
state... The appellant admits there is no statutory provision which
in terms authorizes it to impose on any taxicab owner the condition
that, before he can engage in the business of conveying passengers
for hire he must take out indemnity insurance, but contends that
the authority is among the implied powers of the commission, and
that the logical and reasonable construction of the Act ... (citations
omitted) ... warrants the passage of the orders in this case as con-
ducive to the safety of passengers and others using the public
streets. There is no dispute of the authority of the commission over
the operation of taxicabs.
"It is provided ... by section 373 that 'whenever the commission
shall be of the opinion, after a hearing, had upon its own motion
or upon complaint, that the regulations, practices, equipment, appli-
ances or services of any common carrier or other such corporation
in respect to any services, transportation of persons, freight or
property within this state are unjust, unreasonable, unsafe, un-
reasonably improper or inadequate, the commission shall determine
the just, reasonable, safe, and reasonably adequate and proper reg-
ulations, practices, equipment, appliances and service to be in force
and to be observed in respect to such transportation of persons,
freight and property, and so fix and prescribe the same by order' . ..
"The powers of the commission are such as are conferred by the
Act of 1910, chapter 180, and amendments, known as the Public
Service Commission Law, and all its acts are legislative; but, unlike
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the Legislature, it is limited strictly to the power so delegated.
.. It exercises a naked statutory authority, and has no power save
such as were expressly granted to it by the Legislature and such im-
plied powers as are necessary to enable it to exert its express
powers...
"The appellant contends in effect that, while the Legislature did
not in terms require cabs or motor vehicles operated for hire to take
out indemnity Insurance, it intended that they should and that its
intention is expressed by the 'practices' and 'safety' clauses in the
act. We do not have any expression of the Legislature in the act
as to what its purpose or intention was, but we do have the construc-
tion which an administrative board or creature of the Legislature,
from which the board derives all its authority, places on it. It
assumes to do'what the Legislature has not done. The construction
of the law is a judicial function, and, unless the language of a
statute is so clear and unambiguous as to construe itself, it is for the
courts to say what the Legislature means and intends . . .
"The contention is made here that the order establishes a prac-
tice which would tend to public safety .... In none of these do we
see any meaning or interpretation ascribed to the word from which
it might be inferred that the 'practices' of a public utility or carrier
have to do with anything except its physical operations wliich have
been or, after an order of the commission, would become customary
and usual.
"We cannot, therefore, justify the action of the commission on
the ground that it is or would be one of the 'practices' intended by
the statute, nor do we think it can be supported under the safety
clauses of the act. It is not a device, contrivance, equipment, facility,
practice, operation, or regulation having any relation to public
safety. Such a requirement as the order of the commission imposes
is legislative, and, until the Legislature speaks, those who use the
public roads and streets of this state for business or pleasure are
not required to do anything except to pay their taxes and license fee
required by the Motor Vehicle Act, subject to such regulations as
are required by law."
In Patrick et al, Public Utilities Commissioner of the District of
Columbia v. Smith, 45 F. 2d 924, the validity of a financial responsibility
regulation applicable to motor common carriers was in issue. The reg-
ulation required evidence of financial responsibility as a prerequisite
to obtaining a taxicab license. The statute under which the Commission
issued the regulation provided that public utilities in the District of
Columbia may be "required to furnish service and facilities reasonably
safe and adequate" and the Commissioner was given full power to issue
regulations implementing the Statute. In holding the regulation to be
invalid, the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia said (P. 925):
"We are of the opinion that the commission exceeded the powers
granted to it by the act in promulgating the regulation in question,
and accordingly hold that the decree of the lower court enjoining
its enforcement is right.
"The provisions of paragraphs 2, 92, and 96, of section 8, supra,
plainly relate to the material equipment and facilities of all utilities
within the District and their actual physical operation; also to the
efficiency of the service rendered by them, and the regulation of the
rates charged by them. The act contains no mention or implication
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of any authority delegated to the commission to make or enforce
such a regulation as is involved herein. And, in view of the fact that
such a regulation necessarily imposes a substantial tax upon a class
of persons within the District, which may be diminished or in-
creased at the discretion of the commission, it is not to be presumed
that such authority would be granted by mere implication in the act.
"It must be remembered that the Congress of the United States
exercises exclusive legislative powers within the District of Colum-
bia, and the Public Utilities Commission is merely an administrative
agency...
(3) Structure of the Civil Aeronautics Act
The very structure of Title IV of the Act, which provides for the
economic regulation of air carriers, negates the concept of implied
power in the Board to impose the type of regulation in question. Title
IV follows a clearly defined pattern of granting specific power to the
Board, with respect to those subjects where regulation was deemed by
Congress to be necessary. Thus, as examples, Sections 401 and 402
prescribe certificates and permits as prerequisites of air-carrier and
foreign-air-carrier operations, and the Board is authorized to approve
or reject applications for such certificates or permits; Section 403 re-
quires the filing of tariffs and authorizes the Board to reject tariffs
which are inconsistent with the Act or the Board's tariff regulations;
Section 406 authorizes the Board to fix mail rates; Section 407 authorizes
the Board to prescribe accounting practices; Sections 408 and 409
authorize the Board to approve otherwise prohibited inter-carrier and
personal relationships and dealings; Section 410 authorizes the Board
to disapprove the granting of financial aid to air carriers by other
government agencies; Section 1002 (d) authorizes the Board to prescribe
the lawful rates to be charged by air carriers for interstate and overseas
air transportation, and to establish through service and joint rates in
interstate and overseas air transportation.
Congress has, beyond any question, granted to the Board extensive
authority to regulate the air carriers; but the authority so granted is
not unlimited. Congress has seen fit to withhold from the Board various
powers of regulation which government agencies regulating common
carriers often are granted. Thus, as examples, the Board has not been
granted authority to regulate contract-air-carrier operations, or broker-
age in air transportation services, or issuance of air-carrier securities,
or rates in foreign air transportation, or bills of lading and liability
to the public, or security for the protection of the public in obtaining
payment of judgments against air carriers.
Congress obviously was not unaware of these other tools of carrier
regulation which were being withheld from the Board. The Civil
Aeronautics Act of 1938 was closely patterned after the Motor Carrier
Act of 1935. Yet, in the Motor Carrier Act (passed by Congress only
three years earlier), Congress specifically granted to the Commission
many of the very powers it withheld from the Board. Thus, Section
209 of the Motor Carrier Act prohibits the operation of contract motor
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carriers unless authorized by the Commission; Section 211 prohibits
brokerage in motor carrier transportation unless authorized by the
Commission; Section 214 prohibits the issuance of securities by motor
carriers unless authorized by the Commission; Section 215 prohibits
a certificate or permit from remaining in force unless insurance or some
other form of protection of the public in connection with liability for
personal injuries and property damage has been filed with and approved
by the Commission; and Section 219 prescribes full-value liability of
motor carriers for loss or damage of cargo and authorizes the Com-
mission to establish limitations upon such liability.
Each of the foregoing fields of regulation is unequivocally omitted
from the Civil Aeronautics Act, yet each specifically appears in the
Motor Carrier Act passed by Congress only three, years earlier. Had
Congress intended to grant the Board authority in those fields, it could
readily have done so. The precise language of the Motor Carrier Act
was available as a pattern. The only reasonable conclusion is that
Congress did not intend that the Board should have these powers. The
Board, on repeated occasions, has admitted that it .does not have
authority under the Act to regulate contract air carriers, or air-
transportation brokers, or air-carrier security issuances. Yet, the lack of
authority to act in these fields rests on no different basis than the lack
of authority to regulate air-carrier insurance and financial responsibility
for payment of tort claims.
(4) Legislative History
It is not necessary, however, to determine the intention of Congress
from a comparative analysis of the Act. Congress has fully expressed
its views on this subject.
(a) H.R. 1012 (78th Cong.)
H.R. 1012, 78th Congress, proposed extensive amendment to the
Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, and related legislation.
The bill, as originally introduced, contained an "Air Carrier Lia-
bility Act" which would have authorized the Board to require liability
insurance. Section 210 (a) of the proposed Liability Act required op-
erators of aircraft engaged in air commerce to "comply with such
reasonable rules and regulations as the Civil Aeronautics Authority
shall prescribe governing the filing and approval of insurance policies,
surety bonds, or qualifications as a self-insurer, in such reasonable
amount as the Authority shall require, conditioned to pay any final
judgment rendered under the provisions of this title."
The provisions relative to compulsory insurance were deleted from
the bill by the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce,
along with other provisions relative to air-carrier liability, on the
ground that the Committee desired to study the matter further before
making recommendations. 4
4 House Report, No. 124, 78th Congress, p. 7.
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A review of the hearings held before the House Committee on H.R.
1012 in February and March, 1943, indicates that the framers of the
Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 would be surprised at the Board's present
assertion of power to require compulsory liability insurance. Chairman
Lea twice referred during the hearings to the deliberate omission from
the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 of any provision for compulsory
insurance.
Chairman Lea said, at p. 79:
"When the Civil Aeronautics Act was passed, the air lines were
in more or less difficulty in securing insurance. That was one of the
problems, the specific treatment of which we omitted from the bill,
or the act."
Chairman Lea also said, at p. 367 of the Hearings:
"In connection with the enactment of the Civil Aeronautics Act
of 1938, the problem of insurance for air carriers was developed.
The committee concluded to omit specific legislation on that ques-
tion, thinking that perhaps there would be a development of experi-
ence that would better guide us as to what, if anything, should be
done. It is, of course, apparent that the question of insurance is a
very practical part of the problem of aviation on account of the high
cost of insurance.
"Judging by what has been reported here and what the commit-
tee has learned, it would seem that the committee should very
properly consider giving the Civil Aeronautics Board some authority
in reference to insurance with a view of, in the first place, being
assured that the insurer is a responsible party to carry out the
obligation he assumes, and that the terms of the policy of insurance
should be consistent with the proper protection to the carriers and to
the persons who are beneficiaries under the insurance and also that
so far as practical provision be made to secure reasonable rates for
such insurance and reinsurance."
(b) Other Bills (78th Cong.)
In October, 1943, the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce reported H.R. 3420, a bill designed to replace H.R. 1012.
H. Report No. 784, 78th Congress. A minority of the committee at
the same time submitted H.R. 3491, a similar bill in substitution for
H.R. 1012.
Both of these included a proposed Section 1106 which would have
required the Board "to keep itself informed concerning the business
of insuring and reinsuring aviation. risks," and to "from time to time
report to Congress concerning the adequacy and reasonableness of
aviation insurance and reinsurance."
Thereafter, Congressman Bulwinkle discussed the insurance pro-
visions of H.R. 3420 in an extension of remarks on January 10, 1944. 5
He said, in part:
5 "Misconceptions about the Lea Civil Aviation Bill, H.R. 3420." Cong. Record,
78th Congress, Appendix, p. A-20, A-22.
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"L. THE LEA BILL DOES NOT REGULATE INSURANCE OR PUT THE
GOVERNMENT IN THE ,INSURANCE BUSINESS
"It has been said that the bill provides for Federal regulation of
aviation insurance and puts the Government in the insurance
business.
"This is untrue.
"The bill only provides, in section 1106, that the Commission
shall study aviation insurance, consult with State agencies regulating
aviation insurance, and make reports to Congress. Surely Congress
is entitled thus to secure information on a matter which so pro-
foundly affects all phases of aviation."
Meanwhile, Congressman O'Hara introduced another bill, H.R.
5020, which would have added to the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, a
title dealing with the liability of air carriers. Section 1220 of the bill
provided that "Carriers shall comply with such reasonable rules and
regulations as the Civil Aeronautics Board shall prescribe governing
the filing and approval of insurance policies, surety bonds or qualifica-
tions as a self-insurer, in such reasonable amount as the Board shall
require, making provision, to the extent reasonably possible, for liability
imposed under this article."
In comment on this bill, Congressman O'Hara said, 6
"In addition, in order to make certain that any recovery granted
to a passenger or shipper is promptly paid, the bill grants to the
Civil Aeronautics Board authority to make regulations requiring
appropriate liability insurance. The bill would also help the air
lines to plan their insurance programs with certainty by prescrib-
ing limitations upon the extent to which a passenger or shipper
could recover."
The fact that these several bills, dealing with the subject of com-
pulsory aviation insurance, were introduced in the 78th Congress, plus
the enlightening remarks of their sponsors, particularly Congressman
Lea, who participated so actively in drafting the Civil Aeronautics Act
of 1938, clearly indicate that Congress in 1943 did not construe the
Civil Aeronautics Act as authorizing the Board, by regulation, to re-
quire air carriers to maintain liability insurance.
(c) Act of June 16, 1948, 62 Stat. 470
(See. 504, Civil Aeronautics Act)
Congress, on June 16, 1948, enacted specific legislation dealing with
the subject of liability for injuries to or death of persons, and for
damage to or loss of property, on the surface of the earth, caused by
aircraft. That Act (Section 504 of the Civil Aeronautics Act) specifically
relieved lessors of, and owners of security interests in, air-craft from
such personal-injury and property-damage liability; but Congress did
6 Extension of remarks of June 14, 1944, Cong. Record, Appendix, p. A-3236.
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not see fit, even when dealing specifically with this subject of lia-
bility for aircraft accidents, to prescribe insurance or other financial-
responsibility requirements applicable to those persons who were not
relieved of liability under the Act of June 16, 1948, and whose liability
to the public for aviation accidents continued.
(d) H.R. 8126 (81st Cong.)
H.R. 8126, 81st Congress, proposed to add a Section 505 to the
Civil Aeronautics Act. Paragraph (b) of the proposed section read
as follows:
"(b) The -Civil Aeronautics Board shall, within one hundred
eighty days after the date of enactment of this section, make regula-
tions requiring that no civil aircraft shall be operated in air com-
merce unless the owner thereof has given proof of his ability
to respond in damages in such amounts as the Board shall prescribe
for the death of any person, and for the injury to persons or
property resulting from the operation of such aircraft in air com-
merce. Such proof may be the bond of a surety company, a policy
of insurance, or such other assurances as the Board may prescribe."
An extensive hearing was held on this bill before a subcommittee
of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce. At
page 24 of the Committee Hearings on this bill, its sponsor, Mr.
McGuire, stated:
"Mr. Chairman, at a subcommittee hearing of this committee on
March 13, I was surprised to learn that owners of aircraft are not
required by law to show financial responsibility in case of accident.
Since there are more than 100,000 private and commercial airplanes
now circulating on our airways, it is incumbent upon us to correct
this dangerous situation. For this reason I have introduced H.R.
8126."
There is no suggestion in any of the comments of any committee
member, or any of the numerous other persons who testified on behalf
of various government agencies, the insurance companies, the air
carriers, private fliers, and the public, regarding H.R. 8126, that the
Civil Aeronautics Board already had the power to issue regulations
requiring insurance or other evidence of financial responsibility. The
entire direction of the testimony and the remarks by committee mem-
bers was toward the question of whether this was a power that should
be given to the Board, and it was not given. The bill was not reported
out of committee.
(e) H.R. 7270 (82nd Cong.)
On March 27, 1952, Mr. Clement introduced a bill, H.R. 7270. The
language of this bill is the same as that of H.R. 8126 (81st Congress)
discussed above. The bill was referred to the Committee on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce. No action has been taken on it to date.
In view of the statements by Chairman Lea in 1943, with reference
to the original Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, on the subject of air
carrier compulsory insurance and financial responsibility requirements,
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and the repeated attempts in the 78th, 81st, and 82nd Congresses to
enact such legislation, plus the actual legislation touching on the
subject of liability in the 80th Congress, the contention that such
power has already been conferred on the Board by implication in the
original Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 is indefensible.
In the very recent decision of the Supreme Court of the United
States concerning the steel-company seizures (Youngstown Sheet and
Tube Co. et al. v. Charles Sawyer, No. 744-Oct. term 1951, Decided
June 2, 1952) Mr. Justice Frankfurter discussed the subject of "im-
plied power" and said:
"It is one thing to draw an intention of Congress from general
language and to say that Congress would have explicitly written
what is inferred, where Congress has not addressed itself to a spe-
cific situation. It is quite impossible, however, when Congress did
specifically address itself to a problem, as Congress did to that of
seizure, to find secreted in the interstices of legislation the very
grant of power which Congress consciously withheld. To find
authority so explicitly withheld is not merely to disregard in a
particular instance the clear will of Congress. It is to disrespect
the whole legislative process.* * *"
(5) Effects of Public Law 15, 79th Congress
The imposition by the Board of compulsory financial responsibility
requirements necessarily would involve specifications as to the terms,
conditions, and provisions of the insurance the air carriers could pur-
chase and the persons from whom they could purchase. The Board's
proposed regulation, in fact does just that. By so prescribing, in a
regulation, the circumstances under which air carriers must obtain
their insurance, the Board would be, in effect, regulating the insurance
companies themselves by prescribing not only the type of insurance
that such companies must sell, if they are to remain in the business
of writing aviation insurance, but also the particular companies which
may continue to write aviation insurance.
Every insurance company authorized to sell insurance in the United
States is today subject to the jurisdiction of the Insurance Commission
of at least one State. Those Commissions have the authority to approve,
disapprove, or prescribe the terms, conditions, and provisions of insur-
ance policies issued by companies under their jurisdiction, and they
have the authority to establish the financial and managerial standards
required of companies engaging in the insurance business under their
jurisdiction.
The authority of State Insurance Commissions to regulate com-
panies insuring interstate transportation enterprises is expressly con-
firmed by Public Law 15 of the 79th Congress (15 USC 1011-12), which
was enacted in 1945 following a decision by the' United States Supreme
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Court that insurance was subject to regulation by the Federal govern-
ment under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution.
7
The Civil Aeronautics Act does not specifically relate to the sub-
ject of insurance. Therefore, under the provisions of Public Law 15,
the Civil Aeronautics Act may not be construed in a manner which
would permit any action thereunder to invalidate, impair, or supersede
the regulation of the insurance business by any State.
A regulation issued by the Board which would compel an insurance
company either to change the form of its existing aviation insurance
policy, a form which has been approved by the State Insurance Com-
mission having jurisdiction over that company, or to discontinue writ-
ing aviation insurance, would beyond any doubt be invalidating, im-
pairing, and superseding the applicable State insurance law. Such
regulation would be in direct contravention of Public Law 15. Fur-
thermore, a regulation issued by the Board, under which an insurance
company, duly authorized to issue aviation insurance by the appro-
priate State Insurance Commission, could be declared by the Board as
unqualified under its regulation to issue aviation insurance, would also
directly contravene the express provisions of Public Law 15.
Such action by the Board, moreover, would inevitably lead to juris-
dictional conflicts between the Board and the State Insurance Commis-
sions. The victims of such conflicts will be not only the aviation in-
surance underwriters, who will be placed in the impossible position of
endeavoring to comply with conflicting regulations, but also the air
carriers themselves, with both their insurance and operating authority
in jeopardy pending the resolving of those conflicts. The injurious
effect upon the air carriers of a conflict between Board jurisdiction and
the jurisdiction of State regulatory agencies was fully demonstrated
recently in California. In view of the very specific prohibitory lan-
guage of Public Law 15, and the obvious detriment to the air carrier
interests that a jurisdictional conflict would engender, the Board should
not endeavor to imply from the Civil Aeronautics Act a non-existent
Power.
D. Delegation of Legislative Authority
If, notwithstanding the clear structure of the Act and legislative
history to the contrary, it were to be assumed that Congress by impli-
cation intended in the Civil Aeronautics Act to authorize the Board to
regulate air carrier insurance and financial responsibility for payment
7 The pertinent portions of Public Law 15 are the following:
"Sec. 1. Congress declares that the continued regulation and taxation by the
several States of the business of insurance is in the public interest, and that
silence on the part of the Congress shall not be construed to impose any barrier
to the regulation or taxation of such business by the several States.
"Sec. 2. (a) The business of insurance, and every person engaged therein, shall
be subject to the laws of the several States which relate to the regulation or taxa-
tion of such business. (b) No act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate,
impair, or supersede any law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating
the business of insurance, or which imposes a fee or tax upon such business,
unless such Act specifically relates to the business of insurance ** * " (Emphasis
added).
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of tort judgments, such delegation of legislative authority .would be
unconstitutional.
In Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 79 L. Ed. 446, the
Supreme Court concluded that certain regulations, relating to the
transportation of oil, issued by the President under Section 9 (c), of
the National Industrial Recovery Act, were unlawful because they were
issued pursuant to an unlawful delegation of legislative power by Con-
gress. Chief Justice Hughes, in presenting the opinion of the Court,
reviewed the entire history of this constitutional-law question. In
reaching the conclusion that these regulations were unlawful, he stated:
".... We look to the statute to see whether the Congress has de-
clared a policy with respect to that subject; whether the Congress
has set up a standard for the President's action; whether the Con-
gress has required any finding by the President in the exercise of
the authority to enact the prohibition .. .Section 9 (c) does not
state whether, or in what circumstances or under what conditions,
the President is to prohibit the transportation of the amount of
petroleum or petroleum products produced in excess of the State's
permission. It establishes no criterion to govern the President's
course. It does not require any finding by the President as a con-
dition of his action. The Congress in § 9 (c) thus declares no policy
as to the transportation of the excess production. So far as this
section is concerned, it gives to the President an unlimited author-
ity to determine the policy and to lay down the prohibtion, or not
to lay it down, as he may see fit...
"We turn to the other provisions of title I of the Act. The first
section is a 'declaration of policy.' . . . This general outline of
policy contains nothing as to the circumstances or conditions in
which transportation of petroleum or petroleum products should
be prohibited,-nothing as to the policy of prohibiting, or not
prohibiting, the transportation of production exceeding what the
States allow . . .It is manifest that this broad outline is simply an
introduction of the Act, leaving the legislative policy as to the
particular subjects to be declared and defined, if at all, by the
subsequent sections...
"The question whether such a delegation of legislative power is
permitted by the Constitution is not answered by the argument
that it should be assumed that the President has acted, and will
act, for what he believes to be the public good. The point is not
one of motives but of constitutional authority, for which the best
of motives is not a substitute ... In every case in which the ques-
tion has been raised, the Court has recognized that there are limits
of delegation which there is no constitutional authority to tran-
scend. We think that § 9 (c) goes beyond those limits. As to the
transportation of oil production in excess of state permission, the
Congress has declared no policy, has established no standard, has
laid down no rule. There is no requirement, no definition of cir-
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cumstances and conditions in which the transportation is to be
allowed or prohibited."
Similarly, in Schecter v. U. S., 295 U.S. 495, 79 L. Ed. 1570, the
Supreme Court unanimously held that regulations issued by the Presi-
dent under Section 3 of the Recovery Act were unlawful. In that case,
Chief Justice Hughes said (p. 1584):
"... Congress cannot delegate legislative power to the President
to exercise unfettered discretion to make laws he thinks may be
needed or advisable for the rehabilitation and expansion of trade
or industry."
Justice Cardozo, in his concurring opinion in the Schecter Case
said (p. 1591):
"The delegated power of legislation which has found expression
in this code is not canalized within banks that keep it from over-
flowing. It is unconfined and vagrant, if I may borrow my own
words in an earlier opinion. Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S.
388, 440, ante, 446, 55 S. Ct. 241.
"This court has held that delegation may be unlawful though the
act to be performed is definite and single, if the necessity, time
and occasion of performance have been left in the end to the
discretion of the delegate. Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, supra. I
thought that ruling went too far. I pointed out in an opinion that
there had been 'no grant to the Executive of any roving commis-
sion to inquire into evils and then, upon discovering them, do any-
thing he pleases,' 293 U.S. at p. 435. Choice, though within limits,
had been given him 'as to the occasion, but none whatever as to the
means.' Ibid. Here, in the case before us, is an attempted dele-
gation not confined to any single act nor to any class or group of
acts identified or described by reference to a standard. Here in
effect is a roving commission to inquire into evils and upon dis-
covery correct them."
The issuance of a compulsory financial responsibility regulation by
the Board upon the basis of an implied power, although the Act no-
where specifies standards as to when, in what circumstances, under
what conditions, or upon whom such regulations shall be applied, and
nowhere even mentions the subject of air carrier financial responsibil-
ity-would be precisely the type of action condemned by the Supreme
Court in the Panama Refining Company Case and the Schecter Case.
Although under some circumstances a power to act may be implied, the
legislative standards governing the exercise of such implied power can-
not also be implied. The Board apparently conceives its power under
the Act to include the type of "roving comrhission" which Justice
Cardozo so clearly denounced. Such implied authority, if it does
exist, is clearly an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority.
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II. ECONOMIC JUSTIFICATION
Assuming arguendo that the Board has authority to issue a com-
pulsory insurance regulation, the question then arises as to whether
the Board should do so.
A. The Board's Reasons
The Board has advanced several reasons in support of the proposed
regulation, but none of them are substantial, and they have only a
superficial persuasiveness. Among the more prominent of the reasons
are the following: first, protection of the public with respect to collec-
tion of judgments against air carriers; second, protection of the air
carriers against the effects of excessive losses from accidents; third,
furtherance of public safety; and fourth, enhancement of public accept-
ance of commercial aviation.
The public should have assurance that judgments obtained against
air carriers as a result of accidents will be paid, and admittedly insur-
ance is one means of providing such assurance. It does not follow,
however, at least insofar as the certificated air carriers are concerned,
that a compulsory financial responsibility regulation is required to
provide the public with such protection. The certificated air carriers all
carry insurance of the types prescribed by the Board in its proposed
regulation and with fully adequate limits; and they have voluntarily
done so for many years. In addition to such insurance, moreover, many
of the certificated air carriers have a net worth greatly in excess of any
insurance limits suggested by the Board. These facts are well known
to the Board, both as a result of periodic audits of the certificated air
carriers by the Board and as a result of various surveys of air carrier
insurance conducted by the Board. Moreover, in the entire history of
civil aviation in the United States, no certificated air carrier has ever
been known to default in payment of a personal injury or property
damage judgment against it arising out of an accident. The fact that
the certificated air carrier must establish, as a prerequisite to obtaining
a certificate, that it possesses adequate managerial and financial ability
is, of course, a significant contributing factor to this unassailable rec-
ord of financial responsibility.
The necessity of government regulation in certain fields of com-
mon carrier operation is, of course, recognized. Insurance, however,
is not one of those fields. Neither the railroads nor the steamship
companies have been subjected to compulsory insurance or financial
responsibility regulations, and the record of the certificated air carriers
in meeting payments of claims is clearly as good as, if not better than,
any other form of carrier. Only the Motor Carrier Act of 1935 pro-
vides for such regulation; and when Congress was considering that
legislation the testimony presented indicated that there was a great
number of motor carriers that had neither the financial responsibility
nor the insurance coverage to protect the public. But where, as here,
the evidence is precisely to the contrary, and the certificated air car-
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riers have fully demonstrated their capacity for responsible self-man-
agement in meeting their financial obligations to passengers and the
public, government intervention is totally unwarranted.8
Although the Civil Aeronautics Act has placed the air carriers
under Federal regulation, it has not placed them under Federal own-
ership and management. The air carriers are financed by private cap-
ital and are operated by managers selected by the stockholders. The
protection of the stockholders' investment is the responsibility of man-
agement, not of the government. To date there has not been the
slightest evidence of capital impairment of any certificated air carrier
resulting directly from accidents. The management of the certificated
air carriers, in this regard, has unquestionably been completely sound.
Government intervention is entirely unwarranted and inconsistent with
the traditions of American business.
Insurance or other financial guarantees cannot protect the public
against accidents. It can only pay the public if an accident occurs.
Public safety is enhanced by safety engineering and operating prac-
tices, advancement in radio and radar guidance, improved traffic con-
ditions, and similar contributions to the industry by air carrier and
government research and development.
The air carrier insurance which the Board's regulation contem-
plates is legal liability insurance. In the great preponderance of
jurisdictions legal liability arises only from negligence or wilfulness.
Commercial aviation does not become more attractive to the public
merely because an air passenger's beneficiary will recover damages in
the event the passenger is killed as a result of air carrier negligence
or wilful misconduct. If anything, such a regulation, by its concern
with the eventualities of a disaster, may be overemphasizing the pos-
sible unattractive contingencies of travel generally and air travel
particularly, thereby discouraging, rather than encouraging, the use
of commercial aviation. Air travelers who desire to do so may pur-
chase all-risk insurance, and not merely insurance against air carrier
negligence, at a nominal rate up to limits of $25,000 or $50,000, at any
airline terminal. If public acceptance of air transportation is related
to the insurance protection afforded the air traveler, certainly the in-
expensive all-risk travel policy, and not airline legal liability insur-
ance, is the answer.
8 There are, of course, those air carriers that are not certificated and are
operating under exemptions without having established their managerial and
financial responsibility. If the Board has concluded that regulation is essential,
because of complaints lodged against those carriers, such action may be taken
without subjecting the certificated carriers to such burdens. In American Trucking
Associations, Inc., et al. v. I. C. C., supra, the I. C. C. did not apply the leasing
regulation to railroad leased trucks. This exemption was challenged as an un-
reasonable discrimination. In upholding the exemption, the court found that the
conditions, calling for the regulation of the industry generally, did not exist in
the case of railroad operated trucks stating (21 L. W. 2101):
" * * * certainly it is not required that the Commission extend its supervisory
activities under the rules into fields where the evidence before it indicates no need,
merely to satisfy some standard of paper equality."
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B. Other Effects of the Regulation
Entirely apart from the inequities of imposing compulsory financial
responsibility requirements on the certificated air carriers, there is the
further problem of the expediency of such an undertaking by the
Board. Air carrier insurance is an intricate problem. An air carrier
seeking coverage usually negotiates a complex contract with the insur-
ance company. The insurance is not a standard policy. It may cover
not only passenger liability, and public liability and property damage
liability, but also workmen's compensation, employer's liability, 'hull
insurance, fire, theft, and many other forms of risk. The terms, rates,
and conditions are established on an individual basis, tailored to the
specific needs and the loss experience of the particular air carrier.
Any uniform regulation by the Board would necessarily standardize
insurance and preclude the negotiation of these specifically adapted
contracts of insurance. Such a result can only operate to the detriment
of the certificated air carriers.
Another serious problem would be created by the international
repercussions of the proposed regulation. The representatives of the
United States who have been active in the work of the International
Civil Aviation Organization have frequently had occasion to be con-
cerned over the possibility of application to our international carriers
of onerous and duplicating insurance requirements. The possibility
of worldwide application of insurance regulations by foreign countries
has been regarded as a real danger to our carriers whose operations
are more widespread than those of any other nation. Our carriers
have encountered some difficulties of this sort already, but the problem
has not as yet become severe. Anticipation of widespread insurance
regulations has, however, been sufficient to justify ICAO in devoting
a great deal of attention during the past few years to the development
of a Council resolution designed to prevent the creation of burdensome
insurance requirements. The United States has participated actively
in the discussions of this resolution and has, in this way and others,
manifested concern lest our carriers' insurance programs be inter-
fered with by the governments of the foreign nations into which they
fly, to the financial detriment of our carriers. The Board's proposal
to impose insurance requirements upon foreign air carriers operating
into the United States is directly contrary to the approach which
United States representatives have previously adopted. In view of'
the leadership which the United States exercises in world air trans-
portation, any step that the United States takes toward additional
regulation is bound to cause other nations to follow. This being the
case, by proposing the imposition of insurance requirements on foreign
air carriers, the Board is certainly inviting retaliation against its own
carriers, and promoting the creation of the problem which up to this
time the United States representatives have sought to avoid.
Another problem is that of the qualification of insurance com-
panies. A compulsory insurance regulation by the Board presumably
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would necessitate a determination by the Board as to whether various
insurance companies are qualified to write the required insurance.
With respect to American insurance companies, the Board would
either have to accept the approval of the State Insurance Commis-
sions, or else it would have to establish itself as a Super Insurance
Commission reaching its own conclusions irrespective of action by
State commissions. An even more difficult aspect of this problem
arises because of the very limited air carrier insurance market. Three
domestic groups of insurers today write the predominant amount of
such insurance, and the balance is underwritten by foreign insurers,
many of which are not legally qualified to do business in the United
States. The fact that they have not chosen to qualify, and are not
rated in Best's Insurance Reports, however, in no way reflects on their
integrity or financial strength. Some of the foreign marine insurance
companies (which insure air carriers) have experience and resources
far in excess of any American company. Obviously the Board cannot,
by regulation, preclude the air carriers from using this long estab-
lished market. Yet the Board is ill-prepared to undertake the duties
of an Insurance Commission on a world-wide basis.
III. CONCLUSIONS
The Board appears to lack the legal authority necessary to promul-
gate the proposed financial responsibility regulation. The power to
issue such a regulation does not appear expressly in the Civil Aero-
nautics Act, nor can it be implied as essential to the exercise of an
express power. Moreover, the very structure of the Act, the Congres-
sional history of legislation relating to this subject, and Public Law 15
all refute the contention that the power to issue the proposed regula-
tion may be implied from the Act. Finally, since an implied power
would leave the Board completely without Congressional guidance as
to the nature and extent of such regulation, the existence of such
an implied power would be unconstitutional.
Even if the Board were found to have such powers, the Board has
,advanced no sound reason why such a drastic regulation should be
imposed upon the certificated air carriers, whose record in connection
with the payment of tort judgments has been perfect. On the other
hand, the air carriers would, in fact, suffer real harm from the imposi-
tion of such a regulation, without any benefit accruing therefrom
to the public.
